S
haring of data from clinical trials has the potential to increase transparency and reproducibility in medical research, enable secondary analyses, decrease selective reporting, and accelerate translation of highquality evidence into clinical care (1) (2) (3) . Several solutions have been proposed to encourage the sharing of analyzable research data sets (4 -8) ; however, the conceptual framework is rooted in explanatory clinical trials, which typically obtain explicit informed consent from participants and collect research-specific data focused on a narrow range of outcomes. Pragmatic research embedded in health systems often involves different data sources and data collection methods: It often involves a waiver of patient consent; uses data from the electronic health record; and may include information that could identify patients, health care providers, and health care facilities or organizations. Even if study data would not allow identification of individual participants, the potential for disclosure of sensitive information regarding providers or health systems may be substantial.
Although we enthusiastically support data sharing, potentially identifiable data regarding health systems or providers have the capacity to do harm if taken out of context; used for inappropriate comparisons; or used to single out individuals, providers, or institutions. Health care systems voluntarily participate in embedded research and have raised concerns about releasing unrestricted information from electronic health records. Specifically, health systems or facilities volunteering to participate in research might be penalized by release of detailed operational information that competitors are not required to make public. Measures developed for research may differ from publicly reported quality measures.
In an ideal world of transparency regarding health care processes and outcomes, health systems would have no expectation of or need for privacy regarding quality of health care delivery. However, the world is not perfect, and unintentional disclosure from participation in embedded research may be far greater than that required for public quality measures. Health systems volunteering to participate in research to improve public health may not be willing to bear the additional risk for misuse of sensitive information.
To encourage individuals to participate in clinical research, researchers offer explicit guarantees through the informed consent process that sensitive information will be protected and ensure that participants' protected health information is not exposed through trial activities or data sharing. Even when research studies are granted a waiver of consent to use patient information, researchers are bound to protect personal health information from disclosure. Although no such regulatory protection is in place for providers, practices, and health systems participating in research, a reasonable corollary exists. Such protections are especially important for providers included in cluster-randomized trials, in which explicit provider consent is uncommon. The notion that health systems, providers, or individual practitioners may be participants in embedded research-much like patients-has led some to argue for an ethical obligation to protect the privacy of health care providers and facilities. However, this ethical argument has proved contentious, especially given increasing expectations-or requirements-for transparency by hospitals, health systems, and the pharmaceutical and device industries. Ultimately, the argument for protecting the privacy of health care systems and providers participating in research is a practical one. If those who volunteer to participate in research are required to bear significant additional risk, fewer will volunteer.
To motivate organizations to opt into embedded research for the greater good, we must recognize that sharing patient data might reveal sensitive information about providers or health systems. We recommend coupling that recognition with a framework for data sharing that champions making as much of the data available as possible for general use; allows additional analyses that refine or deepen the original research question, such as subsets or secondary outcomes; and encourages organizations to give serious consideration to other proposed uses while reserving the final authority regarding these decisions.
Researchers can assess risks by considering the sensitivity of each research data element and the risk that providers or facilities can be reidentified, and then reduce the risk by either modifying the data to be shared (such as redacting or masking sensitive data elements) or establishing governance structures appropriate to the level of risk. Potential structures for data sharing (ranging from least to most restrictive) include the following:
Public archive: Any interested users may download and analyze data without restriction.
Private archive: Approved users may download and analyze data, sometimes subject to restrictions, often operationalized in a data use agreement.
Public enclave: Any interested users may submit queries and receive aggregate results.
Private enclave: Approved users may submit queries and receive aggregate results (often subject to review and approval of individual queries).
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A health care organization might allow partial data release by using less restrictive methods while requiring more restrictive methods for data it considers most sensitive.
More restrictive data-sharing structures necessarily require greater resources. Compared with a public archive, establishing a private archive requires personnel resources to review and approve users and specific uses. Compared with a data archive, establishing a data enclave to respond to users' queries requires substantially greater technical resources. When selecting an optimal technical and governance model for data sharing, investigators and participating health systems or practices should consider whether more restrictive (and expensive) approaches would allow sharing of additional data with significant added public health value. We recommend that the following questions be considered:
What data could be shared by the least restrictive mechanism, that is, a public archive open to any interested user?
What additional data could be shared by using a more restrictive mechanism (private archive, public or private data enclave)?
Would the scientific or public health benefit of sharing additional data justify the additional effort to establish a more restrictive data-sharing mechanism?
The research teams for selected demonstration projects of the Health Care Systems Research Collaboratory of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) were 
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IDEAS AND OPINIONS asked to consider these questions when creating a plan for sharing study data. The Table illustrates the solutions put forth by the teams. We are confident that we can establish datasharing policies that will not dissuade health system participation. To balance potential for harm with the ethical imperative to share data, study teams can partner with health care systems to develop data-sharing plans that are the least restrictive and provide appropriate protection for participant privacy, health system privacy, and scientific integrity. 
Data-Sharing Solution
No. The primary analysis can still be closely replicated without the additional data.
Public archive of a modified data set
Possibly. Data sets, including health system identifiers, will be available on request through a supervised data archive, subject to formal agreements about use and redisclosure.
Public archive of a modified data set Yes. Deidentified patient-level data will be available on request, via a supervised data archive, subject to formal agreements about use, redisclosure, and data destruction.
Private archive managed by study team
Yes. Patient-level data will be available via the NIDDK supervised data archive. Identifiers for health care system, primary practice, and patients will be removed.
Private archive managed by NIDDK Yes. All individual-level data will remain behind the health system firewall. A private data enclave structure will allow potential users to propose specific queries, and only query results will be shared.
Private enclave managed by study team
Yes. Patient-level data sets will be deidentified by health systems, clinics, providers, and patients. Investigators will authorize release to specific users for specific purposes.
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